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INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
COMPETITION LAW FOR
TRANSFER
OF ENVIRONMENTALLY
SOUND TECHNOLOGIES
Mahatab Uddin

ABSTRACT
Battling against climate change, “a common concern of
humankind,” is the most prominent global challenge of this
century, and Environmentally Sound Technologies (“ESTs”) are
the main tools to fight this battle. This article examines the
juxtaposed role of Intellectual Property Rights (“IPRs”) and
competition laws in facilitating wide-scale innovation and
transfer of ESTs in developing and least developed countries.
This article covers diverse IPRs, including patents and trade
secrets. The discussion and analysis of the IPRs are based on the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (“TRIPS”). And the discussion on competition law mainly
focuses on competition related regulation of the European Union
(EU). The article concludes with an examination of whether the
current state of relevant national IPRs and competition laws can
facilitate the transfer of ESTs in Bangladesh, which is
considered to be one of the most climate change affected
countries in the world. The article finds that the adoption of a
suitable IPR regime can facilitate innovation and transfer of
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ESTs to developing and least developed countries. However,
some countries can facilitate innovation and transfer of ESTs by
using TRIPS’ flexibilities like compulsory licensing. Competition
laws can also facilitate innovation and transfer of ESTs through
expanding EST markets by preventing abuse of IPRs, for which
countries’ competition laws should include guidelines. Finally,
the article finds that the current relevant IPRs and competition
related laws of Bangladesh are not suitable enough for creating
a favorable environment for innovation and transfer of ESTs.
Hence, this paper recommends amending these domestic laws in
light of TRIPS and on the basis of national interests of
Bangladesh.
Keywords: Intellectual Property Rights, Competition Law,
Patent, Trade Secret, Environmentally Sound Technologies,
Climate Change, Bangladesh, EU, TRIPS
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INTRODUCTION

Technologies are composed of both "hard" products, like
machinery and equipment involved in the manufacturing
process, and "soft" products, like knowledge of science and
technology, skills, know-how and relevant organizational and
institutional arrangements including the goods or services
derived from the process. 1 Accordingly, the term “technology
transfer” refers to the transfer of both tangible tools and
intangible knowledge, or know-how, associated with the tools.2
It is argued that “as long as the technology receiver does not
understand the complete process of use of a particular
technology, one cannot claim that any technology transfer has
taken place.”3 Consequently, full technology transfer takes
place when a technology receiving country is capable of
reproducing and deploying the technology on its own.
However, the sources of funding for technological research
and development concern two quite different sectors: public
sectors and private sectors. Though the technology derived from
public funding is generally not protected by intellectual property
rights (“IPRs”) and is open to the public, almost all technologies
resulting from private fund research are protected.4 While IPRs
are considered an essential incentive for invention and
innovation of new technologies,5 sometimes they can create a
monopoly over the technology market and cause unusually high
prices of the concerned technological product.6 In this regard,

1 MAHATAB UDDIN, CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, AND
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 9–11 (2021); see also Mahatab Uddin & Saiful
Karim, International Law and South-South Cooperation for Innovation and
Transfer of Green Technologies, 52 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 355, 357 (2020);
Mahatab Uddin & Saleemul Huq, Protecting Soft Adaptation Technologies
Under Intellectual Property Rights Systems, 25 UNIV. S.F. INTELL. PROP. &
TECH. L.J. 19, 21 (2020).
2 Id. at 11.
3 Id. at 10.
4 Uddin, supra note 1, at 13–14.
5 Daniel F. Spulber, How Patents Provide the Foundation of the Market for
Inventions, 11 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 271, 272 (2015); see also Rod Falvey
& Neil Foster, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in Technology Transfer
and Economic Growth: Theory and Evidence 1 (U.N. Indus. Dev. Org., Working
Paper, 2006).
6 Taimoon Stewart, The Functioning of Patent Monopoly Rights in
Developing Economies: In Whose Interest?, 49 SOC. & ECON. STUD. 1, 36 (2000).
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competition law can bring market balance through monitoring
abuse of IPRs from those in dominant positions in any given
technology market.7 Therefore, this paper argues that the
transfer of technology is greatly dependent on balanced
interfaces of both IPRs and competition laws because the
harmonization of suitable IPRs and competition regime is
essential to facilitate wide-scale innovation, transfer, and
diffusion of technologies. Based on this argument, this article
aims to explore how this interface can be employed to facilitate
the transfer of environmentally sound technologies (“ESTs”),
technologies which are essential for climate change mitigation
and adaptation,8 in developing and least developed countries. As
an example of a technology-receiving least developed country,
this article will include a discussion on the role of IPRs and
competition laws in facilitating the transfer of ESTs in
Bangladesh, which is considered to be one of the most climatechange-affected countries in the world.9
The discussion and analysis of this article will cover the
governing international treaty of IPRs: The Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(“TRIPS”),10 competition related rules of the European Union
(“EU”), and relevant IPRs and competition related laws of
Bangladesh. The paper will first address diverse channels of
technology transfer such as international trade, foreign direct
investment, and licensing. The article will then cover a
discussion as to how IPRs can influence innovation and transfer

7 Hanna Stakheyeva, Intellectual Property and Competition Law:
Understanding the Interplay, in MULTI-DIMENSIONAL APPROACHES TOWARDS
NEW TECHNOLOGY 4 (Ashish Bharadwaj et al. eds., 2018).
8 What’s the difference between climate change mitigation and adaptation?,
WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, https://www.worldwildlife.org/stories/what-s-thedifference-between-climate-change-mitigation-and-adaptation (last visited
Apr. 5, 2022).
9
How the Climate Crisis is Impacting Bangladesh, CLIMATE REALITY
PROJECT (Dec. 9, 2021, 11:00 PM),
https://www.climaterealityproject.org/blog/how-climate-crisis-impactingbangladesh.
10 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter
TRIPS Agreement].
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of ESTs.
Thereafter, this article will focus on the EU
competition regime as an example of the positive role of
competition law in facilitating technology transfer through
preventing anticompetitive behaviors of concerned IPR holders.
And finally, this paper will discuss and analyze the relevant
IPRs and competition laws of Bangladesh in connection with
their role in facilitating possible innovation and transfer of ESTs
in the country.
II. CHANNELS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
According to statistics, the amount of public fund research
is less than the amount of private fund research in developed
countries, whereas, in developing countries, the amount of
public fund research is larger than the amount of private fund
research.11 But still, the public sector research of the developing
world offers far less technology than the international private
sector does.12 Thus, it is understandable that a large portion of
commercially significant technologies, including ESTs, are
owned by private entities or transnational corporations
(“TNCs”),
predominantly
from
developed
countries.13
Accordingly, TNCs of developed countries play a vital role in
transfer, dissemination, and creation of technologies. The
typical methods followed by TNCs for international technology
transfer include international trade, foreign direct investment
(“FDI”), and technology licensing.14

11 See John Barton, New Trends in Technology Transfer: Implications for
National and International Policy 8 (Int’l Ctr. Trade & Sustainable Dev., Issue
Paper No. 18, 2007).
12 See id. (noting exceptions occur in agricultural sectors, where most of
the research is conducted by international public sectors such as CGIAR,
formerly the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research
system).
13 See generally Fekitamoela ‘Utoikamanu, Closing the Technology Gap in
Least
Developed
Countries,
U.N.
CHRONICLE,
https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/closing-technology-gap-leastdeveloped-countries (last visited Apr. 5, 2022) (detailing the reasons why
developing countries and least developed countries lack large portions of
technologies).
14 Barton, supra note 11, at 1; see Mahatab Uddin, Climate Change and
Requirement of Transfer of Environmentally Sound Technology 4 (2011) (M.A.
thesis,
Uppsala
University),
http://www.divaportal.org/smash/get/diva2:451119/FULLTEXT01.pdf.
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When a country or firm imports higher quality intermediary
products to use in its own manufacturing process, technology
transfer via international trade occurs.15 Generally, intraindustry trade has more significance in technology transfer than
inter-industry trade.16 As intra-industry trade occurs mainly
among developed countries, it is presumed that the developing
and least developed countries enjoy comparatively less
technology transfer facility through international trade.17
Technology transfer via a FDI occurs when a TNC from the
developed world extends its international business into a
developing or least developed country and it brings its own
technology to the place of investment, which results in a
spillover of technologies to the local market.18 A FDI not only
includes technology, but also management experience and
entrepreneurial abilities, which are transferred by training
programs and learning by doing processes. 19 Besides, some
technologies and know-how are not always available in the
market, and are specially used by specific TNCs.20 Thus,
technology transfer through FDI can bring benefits, which are
generally not available through other modes of transfer.21
And technology transfer through licensing happens when a
firm provides a license for using its technology to an agent

15 Uddin, supra note 14, at 7; Immaculada Martínez-Zarzoso & Santiago
Chelala, Trade agreements and international technology transfer, 157 REV.
WORLD ECON. 631, 635 (2021).
16 See generally Dalia Hakura & Florence Jaumotte, The Role of Inter- and
Intraindustry Trade in Technology Diffusion 1 (IMF, Working Paper No. 99/58,
1999) (describing how international trade is an important channel for the
transfer of technology); see also U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., The Least
Developed Countries Report 2020, UNCTAD/LDC/2020 (Dec. 3, 2020)
(explaining the impact of specific technology and types of trade in the least
developed countries).
17 See generally Hakura & Jaumotte, supra note 16 (highlighting that
intraindustry trade between developing and developed nations is far more
effective than interindustry trade).
18 Uddin, supra note 14, at 5–6.
19 Philip Bodman & Thanh Le, Assessing the roles that absorptive capacity
and economic distance play in the foreign direct investment-productivity growth
nexus, 45 APPLIED ECON. 1027, 1035 (2013).
20 See id. at 1037 (highlighting that FDI increases knowledge in technology
and higher capacity labor force that are beneficial for countries).
21 Uddin, supra note 14, at 5.
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abroad, who utilizes the technology to improve production of its
own firm.22 As it is difficult to successfully integrate in foreign
markets through exports only, TNCs tend to choose to provide
licenses of their technology to local firms of the developing
world.23
III. IMPACT OF IPRS OVER TRANSFER OF ESTS
In all of the above-described channels of technology
transfer, the technology owners are generally reluctant to
proceed with technology related business transactions with
developing or least developed countries that have weak or no
intellectual property laws due to the fear and apprehension of
misappropriation of their technologies.24 Arguably, the risk of
imitation is higher in cases of recently invented "high
technologies"25 on which IPRs have not yet expired.26 Though
the risk of losing protected technology is comparatively less in
countries that do not have infrastructural capabilities to reverse
engineer at present, it does not give any guarantee to technology
owning entities that their technology will remain safe.27
The Ginarte and Park IPR index shows that the level of IPR

22 Japan Patent Office, Technology Transfer and Licensing, 1, 3, 18 (2011),
https://www.jpo.go.jp/e/news/kokusai/developing/training/textbook/document/i
ndex/Technology_Transfer_and_Licensing2011.pdf.
23 Id. at 2; Uddin, supra note 14, at 6.
24 See generally Elisabetta Gentile, Intellectual Property Rights and
Foreign Technology Licensing in Developing Countries: An Empirical
Investigation 25 (Asian Dev. Bank, Working Paper No. 515, 2017) (explaining
how foreign inventors are reluctant to participate in business transactions that
offer inadequate protection to their intellectual property).
25 See Mahatab Uddin & Saleemul Huq, Protecting Soft Adaptation
Technologies Under Intellectual Property Rights Systems, 25 INTEL. PROP. &
TECH. L.J. 19, 24 (2020) (stating that “[h]igh technologies are those derived
from recent scientific progress”).
26 See id. at 24–25 (listing various technologies that are still subject to
intellectual property rights).
27 See, e.g., Harvey Rubin & Nicholas Saidel, Innovation beyond patent
waivers: Achieving global vaccination goals through public-private
partnerships,
BROOKINGS
INST.
(Aug.
31,
2016),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2021/08/31/innovation-beyondpatent-waivers-achieving-global-vaccination-goals-through-public-privatepartnerships/ (depicting how despite low and middle income countries’ lack of
proper infrastructure to develop vaccines, inventors still fear the repercussions
of granting them patent rights, which is made evident by their opposition to
the vaccine waiver).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol34/iss2/2

8

Spring 2022 Intellectual Property Rights & Competition Law 71… …
……………………………………
protection has a positive correlation with the potential of
receiving FDI in high-tech sectors.28 Another recent study shows
that the developing countries that recently strengthened their
intellectual property law framework have experienced increased
numbers of licensing agreements with foreign companies,
ensuring effective access by the local firms to the protected
technologies and know-how.29 In fact, scholarship has noted that
TNCs are more interested in offering licenses in countries with
strong IPR protection rather than exporting or selling products
through their affiliations in those countries.30 This is also
supported by a theoretical model by Lei Yang and Keith Maskus
who argue that, to offer licenses for technology in developing and
least developed countries, it is essential that the specific country
has obtained a certain level of absorptive capacity to utilize the
licensed technology.31
The above-mentioned facts concerning IPRs and technology
transfer are arguably more applicable for ESTs. Since many
ESTs are considered "high technologies," invented recently or
still under process of invention based on new and changing
circumstances of global climate, it is common that IPR owners of
these ESTs are more careful about protection of their rights.32
Under these circumstances, it can be argued that ensuring the
existence of an IPR protection regime in developing and least
developed countries would attract the technology owning
entities to engage in international trade, FDI, and licensing in
those countries. In connection with this protection, the two most
relevant IPRs are patents and trade secrets.

See Juan C. Ginarte & Walter G. Park, Determinants of patent rights: A
cross-national study, 26 RSCH. POL’Y 283, 285 (1997) (illustrating the positive
correlation between patent rights and foreign and direct investments).
29 Walter G. Park & Douglas Lippoldt, International Licensing and the
Strengthening of Intellectual Property Rights in Developing Countries During
the 1990s, 40 OECD ECON. STUD. 7, 9 (2005).
30 See DELVIN KULYEK, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AFRICAN
AGRICULTURE: IMPLICATIONS FOR SMALL FARMERS 5 (2002) (discussing the
preference of TNCs to only work with IPRs).
31 Lei Yang & Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights, Technology
Transfer and Exports in Developing Countries 18 (J. Dev. Econ., Working
Paper No. 2464, 2008).
32 High technology, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/high%20technology (last visited Mar. 13, 2022).
28
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IV. PATENT
Among all IPRs, patents have vital importance concerning
technology transfer issues including the issues of the transfer of
ESTs. Like all other kinds of IPRs, the general standard for the
patent system is given by TRIPS, which itself does not grant
patents, but provides guidelines for a national patent system for
the member states of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”).33
In order to obtain patent protection, an inventor, or a
representative, must file a patent application in the country
where they seek protection of the invention, which discloses
technical information about the invention to the public.34 The
invention must fulfill the basic criteria of Article 27 of TRIPS
which requires the invention to be new, involve an inventive
step, and capable of industrial application.35 If the subject
matter of a patent is a product, the patent owner is protected
from others making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing
that product without first obtaining consent from the patent
owner.36 Similarly, if the subject matter of a patent is a process,
the owner of the patent has exclusive rights to prevent others
from using, offering for sale, selling, or importing those products
which are directly made by using the patented process.37
In general, patent rights and protections are limited to the
countries where the patent applications have been filed and
granted.38 For this reason, if a technology is not protected by a
patent in a country, the original innovator of the technology will
have no right to prevent others from commercial application of
the technology. Thus, in many developing and least developed
countries all patented high-tech ESTs are as accessible as public
knowledge.39 But the non-existence of patent rights in these

33
34

2022).

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 29.
Patents, WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/patents/en/ (last visited Apr. 14,

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 27(1).
Id. art. 28(1)(a).
37 Id. art 28(1)(b).
38 Patents, supra note 34.
39 See Neel Maitra, Access to Environmentally Sound Technology in the
Developing World: A Proposed Alternative to Compulsory Licensing 2 (2009)
35
36
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countries does not necessarily allow local firms to reverse
engineer the technology due to the lack of access to the tacit
knowledge, trade secrets and know-how embodied with the
technology, or infrastructural capability to mimic. Such lack of
infrastructural capability can also impede technology transfer
through technology licensing.40
On the other hand, the introduction of a national patent
system in developing and least developed countries in
accordance with the given guidelines of TRIPS will offer a strong
protection of the IPRs over their ESTs owned by the private
entities.41 Accordingly, the assurance of the protection of rights
will stimulate them to make FDI or offer licenses of their
rights.42 More importantly, introducing a strong IPR regime will
build a strong research and development environment,43 which
might bring an absorption level for high technologies resulting
in future innovations and technology transfer in those countries.
A major economic rationale behind patent systems is to
sacrifice static efficiency for the sake of dynamic efficiency of the
market, which in the long run, brings overall social benefit and
infrastructural development to a state.44 Based on this economic
behavior of patent systems, one may argue that the introduction
of a strong IPR regime can be vital for climate change technology
innovation strategy (“CCTIS”) for developing and least
developed countries.45 A CCTIS approach can be a medium for

(on file with Columbia Law School Sabin Center for Climate Change Law)
(showing that since no legal framework of IPRs exists, it is not unlawful to
imitate technology protected in foreign countries).
40 Maitra, supra note 39, at 2–3.
41 Keith E. Maskus, Encouraging International Technology Transfer 22
(UNCTAD-ICTSD Project on IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue Paper
No. 7, 2004) (demonstrating the protection offered for IPRs over private entity
owned ESTs).
42 Id. at 26.
43 Id.
44 Ioannis Lianos et al., Competition law, intellectual property rights and
dynamic analysis: Towards a new institutional “equilibrium?”, 4
CONCURRENCES 13, 15 (2013).
45 See generally Joshua D. Sarnoff & Margaret Chon, Innovation Law and
Policy Choices for Climate Change-Related Public–Private Partnerships, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 245, 257 (Margaret
Chon et al., eds., 2018) (detailing how imbalances in the patent systems of the
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a long term approach of general innovation strategy in the field
of climate change in order to achieve the goal of technology
development and commercialization.46 This long-term approach
based on the patent regime of a state can build a strong local
environment of technological development and simultaneously
ensure a free flow of FDI and technology licensing over the long
term.47
However, from a market competition and consumer welfare
perspective, one major doubt surrounding a patent system is
whether the exclusive right given by a patent system may give
the right owner an opportunity to abuse the right by creating a
monopoly market.48 If an EST patent owner firm is not
interested in licensing its patent to others, fearing loss in its
market position, then such reluctance could create a monopoly
market for that specific EST, which will have a negative impact
in transfer and diffusion of the given EST in that specific
country.49 One solution to such a situation can be achieved
through a provision for compulsory licensing of required ESTs.50
Though the provision of compulsory licensing enables existing
technologies to generate and disseminate more quickly and cost
effectively, the risk then becomes whether it can discourage

global North and South are causing a dichotomy in climate change
technologies).
46 See generally Richard G. Newell, The Role of Markets and Policies in
Delivering Innovation for Climate Change Mitigation, 26 OXFORD REV. ECON.
POL'Y 253, 262 (2010) (explaining how the United States improving its policy
in applied research saw development and commercialization from its solar and
wind energy patents).
47 See Maitra, supra note 39, at 22.
48 See Joined Cases C-468/06 to C-478/06, Sot. Lélos kai Sia EE v.
GlaxoSmithKline AEVE, 2008 E.C.R. I-7196 (explaining how price competition
is limited due to medical patents); see also Joaquín Almunia, Vice President,
Eur. Comm’n Responsible for Competition Pol’y, Speech for New Frontiers of
Antitrust 2012 (Feb. 10, 2012) (detailing how patent holders can negate the
possibility of competition in future generations of businesses).
49 See generally Robert Fair, Does Climate Change Justify Compulsory
Licensing of Green Technology?, 6 BYU INT'L L. & MGMT. REV. 21, 24 (2010)
(describing how corporations that have been granted environmental patents
are very reluctant to relinquish them).
50 Daniel K.N. Johnson & Kristina M. Lybecker, Challenges to Technology
Transfer: A Literature Review of the Constraints on Environmental Technology
Dissemination 11 (Colo. Coll. Working Paper, Paper No. 2009-07, 2009),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID1456222_code57030.pdf?a
bstractid=1456222&mirid=1.
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second-generation
solutions
from
developing
similar
technologies.51 Therefore, compulsory licensing is regarded as a
“static solution to a dynamic problem.”52
Article 31 of TRIPS provides the option of nonexclusive
compulsory licensing under the general term of “use without
authorization of the right holder,” which covers both compulsory
licenses granted to third parties for their own use and use by or
on behalf of governments without seeking permission of the
original right holder.53 This provision of Article 31 allows the
WTO member states to lay down their patent laws, including the
authorization of compulsory licenses, subject to conditions aimed
at protecting the legitimate interests of the right holder.54 Later
on, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health reaffirmed that “each [WTO member] has the right to
grant compulsory licenses and the freedom to determine the
grounds upon which such licenses are granted.”55 While Article
31 of TRIPS does not specify the conditions on the grounds for
granting compulsory licensing for the national authorities,
national laws generally consider the issues of public policies and
issues essential to overcome anti-competitive situations as
grounds for issuing compulsory licenses.56
However, before applying for a compulsory license under
Article 31, the applicant is required to make an attempt to
obtain a voluntary license from the right holder on "reasonable
commercial terms and conditions […] within a reasonable period
of time."57 Taking into account the proper economic value of the
license, the applicant is also required to pay adequate
remuneration to the original right holder.58 It is important to
note that the application of compulsory licenses under TRIPS

Id. at 12.
Johnson & Lybecker, supra note 50, at 12.
53 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 31.
54 Id. art. 31(g).
55 World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November
2001, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 ILM 755, ¶ 5(b) (2002) [hereinafter
Doha Declaration].
56 Lisa Peets & Mark Young, Is the exception becoming the rule?, 195
PATENT WORLD 21, 21–22 (2007).
57 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 31(b).
58 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 31(h).
51

52
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must be only to fulfill the domestic purposes, and the license is
limited to the purposes for which it was granted. 59 As soon as
the purpose disappears, the validity of the license will expire.60
And provisions of compulsory licenses under Article 31 are
subject to judicial review by a distinct higher authority.61 In
cases of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency, in the case of public noncommercial use, or, if a
compulsory license is granted as a remedy in adjudicated cases
of anti-competitive practices, attempting to obtain a voluntary
license is not a necessary step.62
While TRIPS allows granting a compulsory license for
patents without prior authorization from innovators in the case
of a “national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency or in cases of public noncommercial (i.e., government)
use,”63 it is a matter of debate whether such compulsory licenses
are applicable to patented ESTs or not. The 2001 Doha
Declaration made it clear that countries themselves will
determine “the grounds upon which such licenses are granted.”64
Taking this notion of the Doha Declaration into account,
granting a compulsory license for patented ESTs is possible if a
concerned WTO Member state determines innovation and
transfer of green technologies to be an “emergency” or
constitutes “extreme urgency” as these technologies are
essential to combat climate change, which is widely
acknowledged as a “common concern of humankind.” 65
Adoption of a compulsory license for ESTs may not
necessarily be fruitful in all developing and least developing
countries, since most of these countries are not capable of
reproducing or reverse engineering “high tech” ESTs on their
own.66 These countries may benefit from a compulsory license if

Id. art. 31(c).
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 31(c).
61 Id. arts. 31(i)–(h).
62 Id. art. 31(h).
63 Id. art. 31(b) (emphasis added).
64 Doha Declaration, supra note 55, ¶ 5(b).
65 U.N. Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, pmbl., U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015) [hereinafter Paris Agreement].
66 See 'Utoikamanu, supra note 13 (describing the hurdles preventing the
reproduction of ESTs in most countries which include insufficient funding for
59
60
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any advanced developing country produces ESTs using a
compulsory license provision and exports those ESTs at a lower
price to the less advanced developing and least developed
countries.67 Once the less advanced developing and least
developed countries obtain wide-scale access to these
technologies through imports from the advanced developing
countries, those countries will be able to create a suitable
environment for adapting and reverse engineering those
technologies on their own.
Hence, the country's priority should be introducing a strong
patent regime for the purpose of facilitating transfer of ESTs
through attracting FDI, licensing, or international trade. 68 But,
in special circumstances where ESTs are not transferred
through the above-stated channels, capable countries may think
of reproducing that particular EST by using TRIPS flexibilities
of compulsory licenses.69 And for those countries that are not
capable of producing any EST, may consider importing that EST
at a lower price from those countries that are capable of
producing the ESTs through the use of compulsory licenses.
Since mere import of any technology does not ensure complete
technology transfer, exporting countries may require a period of
time to create a favorable environment that would allow for
reproduction of the concerned imported ESTs.70
V. TRADE SECRET
As mentioned earlier, regardless of whether a technology is
protected by a patent or not, most of the developing and least
research, low enrollment rates in higher education programs, and a limited
skilled labor supply).
67 Cf. William Alan Reinsch, Compulsory Licensing: A Cure for
Distributing
the
Cure?,
CTR.
STRATEGIC
&
INT’L
STUD.,
https://www.csis.org/analysis/compulsory-licensing-cure-distributing-cure
(discussing the importance of compulsory licenses for developing countries in
accessing important technology such as COVID-19 vaccines).
68
See, e.g., U.N. Environment Programme (UNEP), Trade in
Environmentally Sound Technologies: Implications for Developing Countries 9
(2018).
69 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 31(b) (articulating that
requirements may be waived under special circumstances which may allow for
more widespread reproduction of ESTs).
70 UNEP, supra note 68, at 124.
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developed countries will not be able to exploit or further develop
any technology due to unknown tacit knowledge surrounding the
use of the technology.71 "Tacit knowledge" is also known as
know-how or a secret "methodology" or "recipe" of the technology
developing entities which they apply at the time of
manufacturing a product.72 Even if a patent is licensed to others,
a patent of the technology is expired, or it is not protected by a
patent in that region, it still remains virtually impossible to
utilize the technology due to this lack of information on secret
know-how, trade secrets, and undisclosed information of its
application.73 Unlike patents, trade secrets can be protected for
an unlimited period.74 Article 39 of TRIPS obligates the member
states to lay down provisions protecting trade secrets.75 To
receive protection as a trade secret, it is essential to fulfill the
following three conditions: 1) it must be “secret in the sense that
it is not, as a body or in the precise configuration and assembly
of its components, generally known among or readily accessible
to persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of
information in question;” 2) it must have “commercial value
because it is secret;” and 3) it “has been subject to reasonable
steps under the circumstances, by the person lawfully in control
of the information, to keep it secret.”76 However, even if a
country lacks sufficient law to protect trade secrets or
undisclosed information, special measures taken by companies,
such as non-disclosure agreements with employees, can provide
a legal shield, through civil remedy, to trade secrets of the

71 Rajarata University of Sri Lanka, Literature Review of Importance of
Knowledge Management to Developing Nations, 7 GLOB. SCI. J. 52, 53–54
(2019).
72 Ed Marsh, The 'Recipe' and 'Know How' Challenge of Top Line Growth,
CONSILIUM
GLOB.
BUS.
ADVISORS
(June
24,
2021),
https://www.consiliumglobalbusinessadvisors.com/stages-of-businessdevelopment-for-b2b-manufacturers/the-recipe-and-know-how-challenge-oftop-line-growth.
73 See Trade Secrets, WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/tradesecrets/en/ (last
visited Apr. 16, 2022) (“Trade secrets are intellectual property (IP) rights on
confidential information which may be sold or licensed.”).
74.Frequently
Asked
Questions:
Trade
Secrets,
WIPO,
https://www.wipo.int/tradesecrets/en/tradesecrets_faqs.html (last visited Apr.
16, 2022).
75 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 39 (2).
76 Id.
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companies.77
From the perspectives of the trade secret owning entity or
firm which is engaged in developing ESTs, it is important to
keep their know-how secret for the sake of their business growth.
Concerned entities will try to create a dominant position in the
market through holding their trade secrets and preventing entry
of their competitors into the market. Hence, in connection with
trans-boundary transfer of ESTs, strong protection of trade
secrets in technology receiving countries can obviously play a
positive role as it protects technology developers’ interests in the
technology receiving country.78
On the contrary, from a consumer’s viewpoint, if no
competition exists in the market, there will be no welfare as the
monopolist or dominant company may discretionarily raise the
price of the product or may supply poor quality goods, in this
case ESTs.79 For this reason, the existence of an appropriate
competition regime is essential to prevent any abuse of trade
secrets.80
VI. TRIPS AND TRANSFER OF ESTS
The above discussions indicate that although IPRs, such as
patents and trade secrets, protect technology developers’
interests, abuse of IPRs by the right holders may impede
transfer and diffusion of technology.81 In this regard, it is
important to note that although TRIPS offers IPRs to promote
technological innovation through protecting the interests of the
technology developers, the ultimate objectives of TRIPS also
encompasses transfer and dissemination of the invented

Trade Secrets, supra note 73 (discussing the different ways that
employers may further attempt to prevent their competitors from entering the
market).
78
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 74 ("In countries with market
economy systems, both in the developing and developed world, fair competition
between enterprises is considered as the essential means for satisfying the
supply and demand of the economy, and serving the interests of the consumers
and the society as a whole.").
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 See Lianos, supra note 44, at 17 (addressing interchangeably the impact
that IP and IPRs have on competition in the market).
77
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technologies.82 Certain provisions of TRIPS clearly refer to the
necessity of transfer of technology.83 Although TRIPS does not
directly mention anything about ESTs, the preamble does
mention that "the underlying public policy objectives of national
systems for the protection of intellectual property, including
developmental and technological objectives."84 In this regard,
the objective clause of TRIPS affirms that "the protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to
the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and
dissemination of technology."85 While references to technology
transfer found under the objective and principle clauses of
TRIPS are broad and do not specifically refer to ESTs, these
provisions play an important role in interpreting other TRIPS
provisions that allow “flexibility” for innovation and transfer of
specific kinds of technologies. This is clear from the 2001 Doha
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health which confirms the
importance of the objective clause of TRIPS as a guiding
principle for the global IPR regime.86
For the purpose of invoking TRIPS flexibility as to IPR
protection over ESTs, the objective clause of TRIPS must be read
in association with the principal clause of TRIPS which allows
member states adopting “measures necessary to protect public
health and nutrition, and to promote the public interest in sectors
of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 7.
See id. art. 8(2) (“Appropriate measures, provided that they are
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may be needed to prevent the
abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices
which unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international
transfer of technology.”); see also id. pmbl. (“Members recognize the
desirability of promoting the transfer of technology and capacity building in
the pharmaceutical sector in order to overcome the problem faced by Members
with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector.
To this end, eligible importing Members and exporting Members are
encouraged to use the system in a way which would promote this objective.
Members undertake to cooperate in paying special attention to the transfer of
technology and capacity building in the pharmaceutical sector in the work to
be undertaken pursuant to Article 66.2 of this Agreement, paragraph 7 of the
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health and any other
relevant work of the Council for TRIPS.”).
84 Id. pmbl.
85 Id. art. 7 (emphasis added).
86 Doha Declaration, supra note 55, ¶ 5(a).
82
83
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development."87 Since climate change is a global concern and a
"common concern of humankind,”88 it is possible to argue that
the issue of innovation and transfer of ESTs, which are essential
to deal with climate change, is a matter of public interest.89
Based on this interpretation of “public interest,” one can deduce
that if WTO member states take any measure for designing or
redesigning its IPR regime for the purpose of facilitating
innovation and transfer of ESTs, at least in principle, it will not
be a violation of TRIPS obligations.90 Therefore, advanced
developing countries which have enough technological base and
capability of imitating ESTs, can arguably do so for the sake of
public interest.91 Besides, TRIPS’ principal clause also allows
member states to take necessary steps to prevent any IPR
holders from exercising their rights in a way which
"unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the
international transfer of technology."92
On the other hand, least developed country WTO members
are automatically allowed to design a suitable IPR regime for
creating a favorable environment for innovation and transfer of
ESTs, even without invoking any broad interpretation for
bringing innovation and transfer of ESTs under the public
interest category.93 This is clear from the notion of TRIPS’
preamble which acknowledges "the special needs of the leastdeveloped country Members in respect of maximum flexibility in
the domestic implementation of laws and regulations in order to
enable them to create a sound and viable technological base."94
In addition to the above-stated TRIPS’ flexibility provisions,
Article 66(2) requires developed country WTO members to
"provide incentives to enterprises and institutions in their
territories for the purpose of promoting and encouraging

TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 8(1) (emphasis added).
Paris Agreement, supra note 65, pmbl.
89 Mahatab Uddin & Saiful Karim, International Law and South-South
Cooperation for Innovation and Transfer of Green Technologies, 52 GEO. WASH.
INT’L L. REV. 355, 375 (2020).
90 Uddin & Karim, supra note 89.
91 See id.
92 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 8(2).
93 Id. pmbl.
94 Id.
87
88
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technology transfer to least-developed country Members in order
to enable them to create a sound and viable technological base."95
This provision can be particularly helpful for wide scale
innovation and transfer of ESTs. Taking into account the justmentioned notions of Article 66(2), if developed country WTO
members offer special incentives to their public or private
developers of ESTs, it will have a threefold impact. First, such
an incentive will promote innovation of new ESTs in those
countries.96 Second, it will facilitate transfer of ESTs along with
know-how associated with them to the least developed countries
through importing newly invented ESTs.97 And finally, it will
help those least developed countries to create a favorable
environment of innovation of ESTs through creating “a sound
and viable technological base” for ESTs.98
While developed country WTO members’ sincere compliance
with the provisions of Article 66(2) will facilitate the creation of
“a sound and viable technological base” for ESTs in least
developed countries, the least developed countries can maximize
the fruits of this technological base through designing a suitable
IPR regime.99 If least developed countries adopt a suitable IPR
regime in line with TRIPS, it will not only create a favorable
environment for innovation of ESTs on their own, but it will also
facilitate the transfer of ESTs in those countries through the
channels of FDI, licensing, or international trade. In this
manner, proper application of Article 66(2) by developed country
WTO members and adoption of suitable IPR regimes by least
developed countries can create a positive cycle of technology
transfer to IPRs to innovation and technology transfer.
VII. COMPETITION LAW AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
While both patent and trade secret protections facilitate the
innovation of technology, it is likely that the abuse of these IPR
protections may cause a market monopoly which will bring an
advantage to the concerned EST developers but a disadvantage

Id. art. 66(2).
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 66(2).
97 Id.
98 Id. art. 66(2).
99 Id. art. 66(2)–67.
95
96
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to new EST developers and the concerned EST consumers.
Taking into account such potential tension between technology
producers and consumers, Article 40(1) shows an agreement of
WTO members that “some licensing practices or conditions
pertaining to intellectual property rights which restrain
competition may have adverse effects on trade and may impede
the transfer and dissemination of technology.”100 Accordingly,
Article 40(2) of TRIPS advocates for adopting competition law
through allowing Members to specify “in their legislation
licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases
constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having an
adverse effect on competition in the relevant market.”101
Moreover, TRIPS’ conditions for granting a compulsory license
predominantly for the purpose of ensuring supply to the
domestic market, may also be relaxed if the compulsory license
is granted as a remedy derived from adjudicated cases of anticompetitive practice.102
Although competition law is aimed at dealing with markets
for goods, the above-mentioned texts of Articles 40(1) and 40(2)
make it clear that competition law can also be applicable to the
market for technology protected by IPRs.103 Successful instances
of this realization are evident in the Guidelines on the
applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (“TFEU”)104 where a horizontal cooperation
agreement distinguishes “product markets” from “technology
markets.”105 The guideline defines the technology market as
Id. art. 40(1).
TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 40(2).
102 Id. art. 31(k).
103 Id. art. 40(1)–(2).
104 See generally Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union to Horizontal Cooperation
Agreements, ¶ 10, 2011 O.J. (C 11) 1 (The Treaty of Lisbon changed name from
the "Reform Treaty" when it was amended and signed in Lisbon, Portugal, by
the prime ministers and foreign ministers of the 27 EU Member States on 13
December 2007. The Lisbon Treaty amends the Treaty on European Union
(TEU) and the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), which is
renamed "Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union" (TFEU))
[hereinafter Guidelines Art. 101].
105 See Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to
Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, ¶¶ 44–49, 2001 O.J. (C 3) 2
(distinguishing “product markets” from “technology markets”).
100
101
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follows:
When rights to intellectual property are marketed separately
from the products concerned to which they relate, the relevant
technology market has to be defined as well. Technology markets
consist of the intellectual property that is licensed and its close
substitutes, i.e. other technologies which customers could use as
a substitute.106

Moreover, the Commission Notice - Guidelines on the
application of Article 101 of the “EC Treaty to technology
transfer agreements” states:
Technology is an input, which is integrated either into a
product or a production process. Technology licensing can
therefore affect competition both in input markets and in output
markets. For instance, an agreement between two parties which
sell competing products and which cross license technologies
relating to the production of these products may restrict
competition on the product market concerned. It may also restrict
competition on the market for technology and possibly also on
other input markets.107

Thus, the distinguished product and technology market
admits that the anti-competitive market behavior can take place
both in the product and technology market. Competition law
addresses IPRs issues on the technology market when IPRs are
applied to fix excessive prices of any technology and/or when
IPRs are used to prevent access to the protected technologies.108
However, the most important interface between transfer,
dissemination, and generation of technology and competition
law concerns the control of restrictive business practices in
licensing agreements.109
It is not always the case that a patent owner goes for
production using the technology that they own. A patent right
owner may not have the required resources to go for production,
or the right owner may decide to produce within some specific
territory by itself and offer licenses for the production in other
areas. It can also be the case that the patent owner wishes to

Id. ¶ 47.
Guidelines on Applicability, supra note 105, at ¶ 20.
108.See
Licensing of IP Rights and Competition Law, OECD,
https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/licensing-of-ip-rights-and-competitionlaw.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2022) (distinguishing between the IPR’s of
competition law).
109 UNCTAD, Transfer of Technology, 22, UNCTAD/ITE/IIT/28 (Oct.
2001).
106
107
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apply the patented process for one purpose and allow the
licensee to use it for other purposes. Whatever the reason is, a
patentee may impose different conditions to the licensee in
terms of price, quality, or quantity of the product produced
through using the patented technology. Whether the conditions
or terms of these patent license agreements are anticompetitive
are monitored through Article 101 of TFEU. 110 The provisions
of Article 101 are related to the own products of the patent
owners, as such it is restrictive only for the intra-technology
competition. Some of the terms of technology licensing
agreements like tie-in clauses, which require a licensee to obtain
a specific kind of technology or products only from the patentee,
or competition clauses, preventing the licensees to handle
technology or products which compete with the patentee's
product, such provisions may prevent the opportunities of other
producers to enter into technology market, may also affect intertechnology competition."111
Article 101 monitors the licensing terms such as Territorial
Exclusivity, Royalties, Duration, Field of use Restrictions, NonChallenge clauses, Improvements, Tying and bundling, and
prices, terms, and conditions.112 If in a license agreement a
patent right holder puts conditions of absolute territorial
exclusivity, the agreement will necessarily hinder competition of
the technology market, and would likely be prohibited by EU
Competition rule. Similarly, if a field of uses restrictions clause
of a license agreement appears to be motivated to hinder
competition it may also be prohibited under article 101(1) of
TFEU.113
A non-competition clause through which a licensee is
restricted to compete by using its own or rival technology is
inserted in a license agreement to foster the production of
patented goods.114 But if such a noncompetitive clause creates a
major negative impact on the technology market, in Europe, it
110 EU competition law and selective distribution, LEXIS PSL (Mar. 28,
2018),
https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Wood-EUcompetition-law-and-selective-distribution-Lexis-3-28-2018.pdf.
111 RICHARD WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 759–60 (6th ed. 2009).
112 Guidelines Art. 101, supra note 104, art. 101.
113 Id. art. 101(1).
114 Id.
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will be treated as an act of non-competitive conduct.115
At the time of application of a patented technology a licensee
may come up with some new knowledge or know-how. In some
license agreements it is seen that the licensor requires the
licensee to grant him or her access to such a kind of subsequently
invented "know how" and not to grant access of the know-how to
others. But such terms in a licensing agreement may also be
objectionable under EU Competition rules.116
Sometimes, a licensor may bundle their own technology or
technological product or may offer a license to the licensee on the
condition that the licensee is required to take a license of another
technology or buy another product from the licensor or from any
designated third party. Though this kind of licensing practice
may promote economic efficiencies, it might hinder fair
competition in the technology market and might be prohibited
by EU Competition rules. Besides, if duration clauses, royalty
clauses, or terms and conditions on prices of a license agreement
seem anti-competitive, it will be altered by the EU Competition
authority.117 It is important to note that the principles of patent
licensing of EU Competition laws are also applied in cases of
know-how licensing.118
Apart from the general terms and conditions of a license
agreement, the most important issue concerning the interface
between IPRs and competition law on technology transfer is
compulsory licensing. As described earlier, a patent holder with
exclusive rights or a know-how holder can abuse their market
power by refusing to allow others to enter the market.119 Article

115 European Union Restrictions On Non Compete Clauses In Distribution
Agreements, STIMMEL, STIMMEL & ROESER LAW, https://www.stimmel-

law.com/en/articles/european-union-restrictions-non-compete-clausesdistribution-agreements (last visited Apr. 16, 2022).

116 The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, arts. 101(1),
179(1), Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C326) 47 [hereinafter Treaty EU].
117 See generally id. arts. 101, 105 (explaining that any agreements aiming
to restrict trade are prohibited, then providing specific scenarios that the
authors in text examples would fulfill, and lastly, explaining that the
Competition authority will enforce article 101); see also European Union
Restrictions On Non Compete Clauses In Distribution Agreements, supra note
115 (explaining specific non compete clauses that are often understood as too
restrictive in the EU).
118 See WHISH, supra note 111, at 766.
119 Treaty EU, supra note 116.
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102 of TFEU prohibits the right holders from abuse of its
dominant position of market: "[a]ny abuse by one or more
undertakings of a dominant position within the internal market
or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible
with the internal market in so far as it may affect trade between
Member States."120 The ECJ judgment makes clear that the
Article is not against a dominant position holder in the market,
but rather it prohibits any sort of abuse of the dominant
position.121 The similar notion of "abuse" has also been inserted
in Article 8(2) of TRIPS: “[a]ppropriate measures, provided that
they are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement, may
be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by
holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain
trade or adversely affect the international transfer of
technology.”122
Thus, in cases of anticompetitive behavior of a patent or
know-how owner, Article 102 of TFEU first needs to determine
the dominant position and then whether there is an abuse of the
dominant situation.123 European law requires that the holder of
the dominant position has “a special responsibility not to allow
its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the
common market.”124 If a dominant position holder fails to show
its “special responsibility” through its conduct in the technology
market, it could be liable for abusing its dominant position. 125 A
dominant position is determined through market share of the
firm within the relevant market, where the firm and product or
technology in question is offered.126
Therefore, defining
“relevant market” is an important critical task, as a larger
definition of market will not allow consideration of a dominant
firm and a narrower definition of relevant market may lead to

Id. art. 102.
See Case 24/67, Parke, Davis & Co. v. Probel, 1968 E.C.R. 72–73.
122 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 8(2) (emphasis added).
123
See Treaty EU, supra note 116, art. 102.
124 Case 322/81, Michelin v. Comm’n, 1983 E.C.R. 3466.
125 See id. (finding an abuse of a dominant position in the Defendant’s
conduct when they failed to show special responsibility in setting up a
contested discount system).
126 Case 85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Comm’n, 1979 E.C.R. 461.
120
121
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an incorrect labeling of a firm as dominant.127 However, if the
dominance and relevant market criteria are properly fulfilled, it
is required to determine whether any abuse of the dominant
position exists.128

VIII.

ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION

The term “abuse” meant by Article 102 occurs in different
manners under different circumstances. In most of the cases,
abuse is occurred through tying,129 limiting production,130 price
exploitation,131 price discrimination,132 or through predatory
pricing.133
Under EU competition regime, it is possible to seek
compulsory licenses based on a “refusal to deal” in intellectual
property. To gain compulsory license on this ground, it is
essential to prove that the refusal constitutes an abuse of
dominant position. In a 1995 European case, refusal of
authorization for a reasonable remuneration was considered
abusive conduct.134 The “doctrine of essential facility,” is applied
to seek, grant, and issue compulsory licenses in case of a refusal

See id. (discussing the importance of delimiting the relevant market).
Id. at 470.
129 See Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-4463.
130 Treaty EU, supra note 116, art. 102(2)(b) ("limiting production, markets
or technical development to the prejudice of consumers" is considered an abuse
by a dominant undertaking); see also Case 30/87, Corinne Bodson v. SA
Pompes, 1988 E.C.R. 2479.
131 Treaty EU, supra note 116, art. 102(2)(a) (noting that “directly or
indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading
conditions" is considered abusive); see also Case 30/87, Corinne Bodson v. SA
Pompes, 1988 E.C.R. 2479.
132 Treaty EU, supra note 116, art. 102(2)(c) (noting that "applying
dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage" is an abuse of dominant
position); see also Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar Plc v. Comm’n, 1999, E.C.R. II02969.
133 See Case T-340/03, France Telecom SA v. Comm’n, 2007 E.R.C. II-00107
(explaining that predatory pricing is dropping prices of a product so much that
in order one's smaller competitors cannot cover their production costs and wipe
out from business).
134 See DAVID A. LATHAM, SHOULD COMPETITION LAW BE USED TO COMPEL
THE GRANT OF LICENSES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS? 26 (Lovell White
Durrant ed., 1996).
127
128
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to deal.135 Under European law, an essential facility may be a
"product such as a raw material, an intellectual property right,
a service, information, infrastructure, or access to a physical
place such as a harbor or an airport, or a part of a
telecommunications network, or a software interface."136 In
Commercial Solvents vs. Commission,137 it was established that
a refusal to supply can amount to an abuse of a dominant
position, in some circumstances. While the refusal to supply of
Commercial Solvents would cause elimination of its only
competitor due to its negative impact on downstream market, it
was considered an abuse of dominant position and accordingly
an anticompetitive measure.138 However, the view was made
clear by the Court that ownership alone does not confer
dominance and refusal alone does not constitute abuse.139 To
apply this doctrine, some special circumstances must exist.140
However, the law in cases of refusal to license suggests that it is
stricter and harder to prove abuse in those situations.141
The circumstances make the refusal exceptional and to
show an abuse of dominance, three conditions must be met.142
First, the refusal is required to be related to a product or service
essential for the exercise of a particular action in the relevant
market.143 Second, the refusal is required to be of a particular
kind, which excludes any effective competition in that relevant

Id. at 28.
John Temple Lang, The Application of Essential Facility Doctrine to
Intellectual Property Rights Under European Competition Law, in ANTITRUST,
PATENTS, AND COPYRIGHT: EU AND US PERSPECTIVES 62 (François Lévêque &
Howard Shelanski eds., 2005).
137 See Joined Cases 6 & 7-73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. &
Com. Solvents Corp. v. Comm’n Eur. Communities, 1974 E.C.R. 223.
138 Market Abuse and Affected Trade, LAWTEACHER (July 17, 2019),
https://www.lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/european-law/market-abuse-andaffected-trade-law-essays.php.
139 Id.
140 See Shamnad Basheer, Block Me Not: How ‘Essential’ are Patented
Genes?, 2005 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 55, 76 (2005).
141 See generally RICHARD WHISH & DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION LAW 802–
3 (7th ed. 2012) (describing the factors that must be satisfied in order to prove
refusal to license).
142 Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-03601, ¶ 6.
143 Id.
135
136
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market.144 And third, the refusal is required to prevent entry of
a new product for which there is possible demand.145 A similar
description of special circumstances is also found in the Magill
case,146 where the Court considered whether a refusal to grant a
license in exercising in IPRs may be considered an abuse if lack
of an actual or potential substitute for the product exists.147
Specifically, looking at whether regular and constant demand of
the product exists, and if refusal to grant a license prevents
entry of new products in a market.148 Though the third condition
(only applicable in cases where IPRs are involved) has specified
a higher threshold for IPRs involving cases, "the essential
facility doctrine" can work as a catalyst to balance a market
competition through granting compulsory license of essential
patent or know-how in the technology market.149
Thus, in addition to the licensing agreement provisions of
Article 101 of TFEU, and general provisions concerning abuse of
dominant position of Article 102 of TFEU, the "essential
facilities doctrine" may also be applied to ensure access to
protected technologies resulting in technology transfer.150 This
doctrine may ensure exploitation of the ESTs, particularly in the
secondary market, even in the absence of any other abusive
conduct.151 Under this doctrine, the refusal to grant third
parties’ access to essential technologies, in this case ESTs, will
offer enough grounds to pursue a dominant firm/TNC to offer
license on non-discriminatory and reasonable terms. 152

Id. ¶ 332.
Id.
146 Joined Cases C-241 & C-242/91, Radio Telefis Eireann v. Comm’n, 1995
E.C.R. I-743.
147 Id. at 818.
148 Id. at 817–18.
149 Mauro Squitieri, Refusals to License Under European Union
Competition Law After Microsoft, 65 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 1, 67–68, 83 (2012).
150 Guidelines Art. 101, supra note 104, arts. 101–02; Reiko Aoki & John
Small, Compulsory licensing of technology and the essential facilities doctrine,
16 INFO. ECON. & POLICY 13, 14–15 (2004).
151 See, e.g., Squitieri, supra note 149, at 70 (explaining a situation in which
the essential facilities doctrine could be abused).
152 See City of Chanute, Kan. v. Williams Natural Gas, 955 F.2d 641, 648
(10th Cir. 1992) (stating that "access to an essential facility must be `upon such
just and reasonable terms and regulations as will, in respect of use,
character and cost of service, place every such company upon as nearly an
equal plane as may be with respect to expenses and charges as that occupied
144
145
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However, both IPRs and competition law systems are
complementary in terms of the common fact that both regimes
ultimately promote innovation and foster market efficiency.153
Yet, it cannot be ignored that the direct and immediate goal of
these two systems conflict with each other, as the IPR system is
aimed to protect the interest of the innovators while competition
laws are aimed to protect consumers’ interest, especially under
the EU Competition law.154 Thus, harmony within the market
economy for ESTs can only be sought by taking into account the
interfaces of IPRs and competition law regimes.155
IX. IPRS AND COMPETITION LAW FOR TRANSFER OF ESTS IN
BANGLADESH
A. 5.1. IPRs
As the above-mentioned discussions demonstrate, a suitable
combination of IPRs and competition laws can play a significant
role in facilitating innovation and transfer of ESTs. Bangladesh,
a WTO member and a Party to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”),156 must ensure
harmony between a suitable IPR regime and an appropriate
competition law regime to create a favorable environment for
innovation and transfer of ESTs. The UNFCCC suggests
building a suitable patent regime and effective trade secret
protection measures for the purpose of ensuring transfer of ESTs
via increased international trade, FDI, licensing, and research
and development activities.157
by the proprietary companies'" (citing U.S. v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S.
283, 411 (1912)).
153 ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT (OECD),
COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 7 (1997).
154 OECD, COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS,
supra note 153, at 145.
155 KEITH E. MASKUS, PRIVATE RIGHTS AND PUBLIC PROBLEMS: THE GLOBAL
ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 244 (Peterson
Inst. for Int'l Econ. ed., 2010).
156.See
UNFCCC
Parties,
U.N
CLIMATE
CHANGE
https://unfccc.int/process/parties-non-party-stakeholders/parties-conventionand-observer-states (last visited Apr. 17, 2022) (listing Bangladesh as a Party
to the Convention).
157 Climate Change and Technology Transfer: Addressing Intellectual
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Current patent law of Bangladesh was initially enacted in
1911,158 though later amended several times.159 Since this
patent law was enacted during the British India period, it does
not necessarily reflect the country's current need and demand of
technological innovation, let alone the demand of innovation and
transfer of ESTs. More importantly, this hundred-year-old
patent law does not reflect one of main the spirits of TRIPS: the
transfer and dissemination of technology.160
While TRIPS set the minimum tenure of patent protection
for twenty years,161 Bangladesh’s patent law offers patent
protection for sixteen years162 from the date of filing with a
possible extension for ten years.163 Although this law contains a
provision of compulsory licensing, the provision is not applicable
to public interest cases. 164 Instead, the compulsory license
provision of Bangladesh patent law is merely applicable where
a patent owner fails to fulfill market demand for the patented
product.165
While existing patent law of Bangladesh lacks suitable
substantive provisions reflecting the country's need for
promotion of transfer of technologies like ESTs, the patent
regime of Bangladesh also suffers from weak institutional
mechanisms. For example, the patent registration office of
Bangladesh does not have enough staff and resource
personnel.166 On average it takes at least twenty-one months to

Property
Issues,
THIRD
WORLD
NETWORK
2,
14
https://unfccc.int/ttclear/misc_/StaticFiles/gnwoerk_static/TEM_tec_cfi_ee/784
3d4ba5e5e459c99deb4e47b972e83/f7d4f254005e4fb786bd4cf1679e5d1a.pdf
(last visited Apr. 17, 2022).
158 Patents and Designs Act, 1911 (Act. No. II/1911) (P.R. Bangl.).
159 See id. ¶ 8 (stating that paragraph 8 was repealed by section 4 of the
Indian Patents and Design Act of 1930, an amendment to the Patents and
Design Act of 1911).
160 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 7.
161 Id. art. 33.
162 Patents and Designs Act ¶ 14(1).
163 See id. ¶ 15 (6) (stating a proposed new draft patent law has suggested
the tenure of protection for 20 years which is in line with TRIPS).
164 Id. ¶ 22.
165 Id. ¶ 22(4).
166 M. KAMAL UDDIN, D RAFT REPORT ON INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY FOR BANGLADESH A PROJECT OF WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION (WIPO) 142 (2013).
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receive patent registration from an application’s date of filing.167
Moreover, Bangladesh does not have a special court to deal with
patent related issues,168 which in many cases require a judge
that has sound knowledge on particular scientific matters.169 At
present, judges for the conventional courts of Bangladesh are not
properly trained to deal with patent or other IPR related
matters.170 Moreover, Bangladesh does not have a specific law
to protect trade secrets except for general provisions found under
Contract Act 1872 and Competition Act 2012.171
Therefore, Bangladesh requires a strong patent regime
based on a revised patent law which will not only reflect the
country’s need of advancing technological innovation but also
consider the necessity of creating a favorable environment for
innovation and transfer of ESTs. Bangladesh needs to adopt
effective law regarding protection of trade secret or undisclosed
information as enumerated under Article 39 of TRIPS.
B. 5.2. Competition Law
Although Bangladesh adopted a competition law in 2012, its
objective is focused on creating an atmosphere of market
competition.172
While the national competition law of
Bangladesh is mainly aimed at creating a favorable environment
for competition in trade, the objective of the Act is expected to be
fulfilled through prevention, control, or eradication of “collusion,
monopoly and oligopoly, combination or abuse of dominant
position or activities adverse to the competition.”173 Although all
these steps are necessary for creating a favorable environment

Id.
Id. at 147.
169 See generally id. at 60 (explaining all concerned in IPR enforcement
should receive extensive training on the appropriate laws including judges).
170 Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop. Rights,
Communication from Bangladesh: Priority Needs for Technical and Financial
Cooperation, ¶ 27, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/546 (Mar. 23, 2010).
171 Alfred Christopher D’Silva, Protection Of Trade Secret, DAILY STAR,
https://www.thedailystar.net/law-our-rights/protection-trade-secret-1497535
(Nov. 28, 2017, 12:41 AM).
172 Ministry of Commerce, The Competition Act, 2012, S.R.O. No. 48Law/2017, ¶ 23 (Notified on March 2, 2017) [hereinafter The Competition Act].
173 The Competition Act pmbl.
167
168
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for market competition, the objective of the Act clearly misses
the necessity of promotion of consumers’ welfare and national
sustainable development. One may argue that the omission of
consumers’ welfare is based on the reality that a separate
legislative and regulatory framework, namely the Consumer
Right Protection Act No. 26 of 2009 and the National Consumers’
Right Protection Council, exist to deal with the issues
concerning protection of consumers from anti-consumer right
practice.174
In fact, Bangladesh’s competition law was enacted mainly
to bring the country's trade law framework in line with the world
trading system.175 While it is praiseworthy that Bangladesh has
aligned its national trade regime with global trade policy
directions, it would be more effective if at the time of preparing
the draft, the law makers would have considered Bangladesh’s
international obligations derived from other regimes of
international laws.
For instance, being a signatory of
UNFCCC176 and the Paris Agreement,177 Bangladesh has
obligations to deal with climate change issues in a globally
agreed upon manner, one of which includes creating a favorable
environment for innovation and transfer of environmentally
sound technologies.178
If Bangladesh’s competition law contained inclusive
sustainable development as part of its objective, arguably it
could ensure a kind of market competition that would contribute
to all social, economic, and environmental development, which

174 See generally Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, The
Consumers’ Right Protection Act, 2009, S.R.O. No. 08-Law/2014 (Notified on
Jan. 20, 2014) (“An Act to make provisions for the protection of the rights of
the consumers, prevention of anti-consumer right practices and for matters
connected therewith.”).
175 Sharmin Tania & Afroza Bilkis, Competition Law in Bangladesh:
Towards Achieving Inclusive Sustainable Development, 21 AUSTRALIAN J.
ASIAN L. 159, 159 (2021); see Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the
Secretariat: Trade Policy Review of Bangladesh, WTO Doc. WT/TPR/S/385
(Feb. 6, 2019) (outlining the detailed policy regarding trade law and
competition in Bangladesh).
176 UNFCCC Parties, supra note 156.
177 Paris Agreement, supra note 65, pmbl.
178
Target 17.7: Environmentally Sound Technology, UNCTAD,
https://stats.unctad.org/Dgff2016/partnership/goal17/target_17_7.html (last
visited Apr. 17, 2022); Pieter Pauw et al., Subtle differentiation of countries’
responsibilities under the Paris Agreement, 5 PALGRAVE COM. 1, 5 (2019).
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includes battling climate change and creating a favorable
environment for innovation and transfer of ESTs in Bangladesh.
Similar to EU Competition related rules described under
section 4 of this paper, competition laws of Bangladesh have
adopted “bundling” or “tie-in arrangements” as anti-competitive
behavior.179 Section 15(3) of the Act enumerates that any “tie-in
arrangement,”180 “exclusive supply agreement,”181 “exclusive
distribution agreement,”182 “refusal to deal,”183 and “resale price
maintenance”184 will be considered anti-competitive steps if they
have an adverse impact on competition. 185 But, the Act confirms
that such prohibition of anti-competitive measures will not
affect “the right of any person, to restrain any infringement of,
or for protecting intellectual property rights conferred under the
intellectual property law, to impose reasonable conditions.”186
The Act, however, does not explain what constitutes reasonable
conditions and what possible consequences an IPR owner may

The Competition Act §15(3).
Id. §15(3)(a) (“[A]n agreement or understanding requiring a purchaser
of goods, as a condition of such purchase, to purchase some other goods or
facilities from any other person or enterprise engaged by the seller.”).
181 Id. §15(3)(b) (“[A]n agreement restricting in any manner the purchaser
in the course of his trade from acquiring or otherwise dealing in any goods
other than those of the seller.”).
182 Id. §15(3)(c) (“[A]n agreement which limits, restricts or withholds the
output or supply of any goods or allocates any area or market for the disposal
or sale of the goods.”).
183 Id. §15(3)(d) (“[A]n agreement which restricts, by any manner the
persons or classes of persons to whom goods are sold or from whom goods are
bought.”).
184 The Competition Act §15(3)(e) (“[A]n agreement to sell goods on
condition that the prices to be charged on the resale by the purchaser shall be
the prices stipulated by the seller unless it is clearly stated that prices lower
than those prices may be charged.”).
185 Id. §15(2) (“The practice or decision of any person or association who
are engaged in identical or similar trade of goods or services shall be deemed
to have adverse effect on competition in goods or services market if it (a)
directly or indirectly (i) determines abnormal purchase or sale prices; or (ii)
determine the deceptive price in all process including bid rigging; (b) limits or
controls production, supply, markets, technical development, investment or
provision of services; (c) shares the market or source of production or provision
of services by the way of allocation of geographical area of market, or type of
goods or services, or number of customers in the market or any other similar
way.”).
186 Id. §15(4)(i).
179
180
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experience in case of imposing unreasonable conditions.187
In relation to the transfer of ESTs, the Competition Act of
Bangladesh ignores the most important issue concerning the
interface between IPRs and competition law: compulsory
licensing. While the EU competition regime allows an option for
compulsory license of technology for some special circumstances
like abuse of dominant position through refusal of authorization
of IPR for a reasonable remuneration, there is not a similar or
comparable provision in the Competition Act of Bangladesh.
Similar to the EU competition related rules, the Bangladesh
Competition Act prohibits abuse of dominant position.188 But,
while the EU competition regime considers refusal to supply
which may result in elimination of a market competitor as an
abuse of dominant position, the Competition Act of Bangladesh
does not include the provision of refusal to supply as an abuse of
dominant position.189
It is observed that substantial provisions of the Bangladesh
Competition Act have been greatly influenced by the 2002
Competition Act of India,190 but the procedural mechanism of the
Act has adopted an approach which is closely akin to the model
adopted by the European Commission. Under this model, the
competition commission of Bangladesh is entrusted with a dual
role of prosecution and adjudication. This model of the
European Commission has been criticized for its drawback of
creating an opportunity for inherent bias in favor of the decision
makers.191 This is because the Commission as an adjudicator
might not go against the findings of the investigation and
inquiries conducted by officials who belong to its own
authority.192 Although the Bangladesh Competition Act has
successfully adopted this EU approach of dual role of prosecution
and adjudication, it is not clear why the Act did not consider
some other substantive provisions of the EU Competition regime
which might bring benefit for the country's technological

See id.
The Competition Act § 15(4)(i).
189 Id.
190 Tania & Bilkis, supra note 175, at 164.
191 Terry Calvani & Angela M. Diveley, The FTC at 100: A Modest Proposal
for Change, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1174 (2014).
192 Calvani & Diveley supra note 191 (detailing the ways this form of bias
might manifest under this policy).
187
188
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advancement.
In connection with creating a favorable atmosphere for
innovation and transfer of ESTs, one important drawback of the
Bangladesh competition law is that it does not distinguish
technology from other products as the EU competition regime
does.193
Accordingly, the Act remains silent about
noncompetitive clauses in technology license agreements.194
While Article 40(2) of TRIPS advocates for adopting
competition law addressing “licensing practices or conditions
that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of intellectual
property rights,”195 the Competition Act of Bangladesh
completely ignores the issue of the abuse of intellectual property
rights.196 This means that in connection with creating a
favorable environment for innovation and transfer of ESTs, the
current Competition Act of Bangladesh has left the issues of
using IPRs for fixing excessive process of any technology and
control of restrictive business practices in IPR licensing
agreement out of its focus. Consequently, the Act also skips the
issue of whether a patent licensee can grant any know-how or
new knowledge one comes across at the time of application of
any licensed patented technology.197
Under the EU competition regime, absolute territorial
exclusivity or a field of use restrictions hindering competition is
prohibited for technology license agreement.198 But since there
is no clause that deals with technology or licensing technology in
the Completion Act of Bangladesh, such practices are not
explicitly barred under the current Competition Act of

193 See generally The Competition Act (showing that no meaningful
distinction or carve out is made for technology specifically).
194 Id. §§ 15(2)(b), 16(2)(b) (showing that the only mentions of anything
technology related are irrelevant to license agreements).
195 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 40.
196 Saurov Dash Roni, The Right to Repair and IP Rights in Bangladesh,
DAILY STAR (Jan. 8, 2022), https://www.thedailystar.net/law-our-rights/rightsadvocacy/news/the-right-repair-and-ip-rights-bangladesh-2934676.
197 See generally The Competition Act (pointing out the shortcomings in
the Competition Act of Bangladesh stemming from the abuse of IP rights).
198 Guidelines on the Application of Article 101 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union to Technology Transfer Agreements, 2015
O.J. (C89) 3, 5.
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Bangladesh.199
X.

CONCLUSION

To create a wide-scale, smooth transfer of ESTs, both
developed countries that own most of the technology developing
entities and the developing and least developed countries that
require technologies, need to ensure a kind of market structure
and certain level of government intervention that can create a
favorable environment for innovation and transfer of
technologies. While introduction of a strong IPR regime,
particularly a strong patent regime and proper trade secret
protection, can be a vital step for the creation of such a favorable
environment for many least developed and developing
countries,200 many developed and developing countries can also
benefit from using TRIPS flexibilities. Since the issue of
innovation and transfer of ESTs is a matter of public interest,201
if countries were to adopt special or innovative IPR related
measures for this issue, theoretically, it would not be barred by
TRIPS.
While designing, or redesigning, IPR regimes reflecting a
countries’ respective needs can be an important step for creating
a favorable environment for innovation and transfer of ESTs, it
needs to be further accompanied with adoption of a proper set of
competition laws. At the time of adopting national competition
laws, countries must ensure that the guidelines given under
Article 40 of TRIPS are properly integrated.
The EU
competition regime’s provision to prevent abuse of IPRs can also
be an inspiration for a country’s development of its competition
related laws. But mere existence of IPRs and competition
related laws do not offer any advantage in creating a favorable

See generally The Competition Act (showing there is no exclusivity of
intellectual property licensing agreements within the same territory that may
hinder competition, unlike what is spelled out in TFEU).
200 See ZHANG XILIANG, ENABLING THE TRANSFER OF ENVIRONMENTALLY
SOUND TECHNOLOGIES IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE: SOME LESSONS
FROM ASIA 4–5 (Tsinghua Univ. Beijing 2000).
201 See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 8(1) (explaining that in
amending laws and regulations, members may adopt measures necessary to
“protect public health [...] and to promote the public interest in sectors of vital
importance to their socio-economic and technological development” such as
ETSs).
199
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environment for facilitating innovation and transfer of ESTs.
For the purpose of gaining actual benefit arising from the
interfaces of IPRs and competition law it is important that each
set of laws can fulfill the concerned country’s national demands
and priorities.
In the case of Bangladesh, although it has adopted patent
and competition laws, provisions of these laws are insufficient to
create a favorable environment for innovation and transfer of
ESTs.202 Current patent law of the country was developed more
than one hundred years ago which does not reflect the country's
current need for the creation of a favorable environment for
innovation and transfer of ESTs.203 As such, it is recommended
that a revised version of the patent law will necessarily address
this need. To attract investment and innovation of ESTs, new
patent law may consider offering a set of advantages or facilities
for innovation of ESTs. At the same time, Bangladesh’s patent
law should also align with TRIPS through including a
compulsory licensing provision as enumerated under Art 31 of
TRIPS.204 Moreover, Bangladesh should adopt a set of laws to
secure trade secrets and undisclosed information as enumerated
under Article 39 of TRIPS.205
Since Bangladesh is expected to graduate from a least
developed country (“LDC”) to a middle-income country by
2026,206 soon the country’s IPR regime will need to comply with
all of the TRIPS provisions. For this purpose, Bangladesh will
need to design its IPR regime to not contradict TRIPS provisions

202 Rumana Helali Azad Lima, Basics of Patent Law in Bangladesh, 13
INFO. & COMMC’N TECH. L. 401, 408 (2021) (proving Bangladesh has patent
laws); see Khan Arman Shovon, Electronic waste Management in Bangladesh:
Challenges of Environmental Law, LAWYERSCLUBBANGLADESH.COM (Apr. 7,
2021, 1:19 PM), https://lawyersclubbangladesh.com/en/2021/04/07/electronicwaste-management-in-bangladesh-challenges-of-environmental-law/
(providing one of many examples of lacking ESTs in Bangladesh).
203 See Lima, supra note 202, at 408 (indicating when Bangladesh patent
law was developed).
204 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 31.
205 Id. art. 39.
206.Bangladesh calls for balanced IPR system to fight Covid-19,
DHAKATRIBUNE
(Oct.
6,
2021,
2:31
PM),
https://archive.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2021/10/06/bangladesh-callsfor-balanced-ipr-system-to-fight-covid-19.
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but at the same time reflect the country’s national interests. 207
Since Bangladesh has been experiencing climate change
adversities in a more deadly manner than most other
countries,208 it should make creating a suitable environment for
innovation and transfer of ESTs one of its main objectives.
Just as the IPR regime, current competition law of
Bangladesh should be revised through the addition of provisions
for the purpose of facilitating a favorable environment for
expanding the market for ESTs.
For instance, current
competition law should clearly distinguish technology from
other products and services to offer some guidance for technology
licensing agreements. The inclusion of the rules like Article 101
of TFEU can govern the licensing agreement on ESTs in a way
that can ensure easier access to the ESTs by consumers.
Current competition law should also introduce a compulsory
license provision. Since compulsory licenses obtained under
Article 102 of TFEU can offer a broader scope of use than those
obtained under Article 31 of TRIPS,209 Bangladesh may consider
adopting the TFEU approach of compulsory licenses as far as it
reflects the country's national demand. Since there is no rigid
structure for the concept of refusal to deal and the doctrine of
essential facilities, for the purpose of creating a favorable
environment for wide scale expansion of ESTs, Bangladesh
should define and adopt these concepts and doctrines as per its
own circumstances. In this regard, the law makers must be
innovative and create unique provisions that reflect the unique
needs of the country. For these changes to create a favorable
environment for the innovation and transfer of ESTs,
Bangladesh must bring about amendments to the above-stated
laws and ensure that the changes made are enforced in the
appropriate manner.
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(Dec.
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11:00
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209 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 10, art. 31.
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